Making a difference: Why study autism by Frith, U
 1 
Why study autism? 
by Uta Frith 
 
In: Scientists Making a Difference. One hundred eminent behavioral and brain 
scientists talk about their most important contributions.  
Robert J. Sternerg, Susan T. Fiske & Donald J Foss Eds. Cambridge University 
Press, 2016 
 
 
 
 
  
 2 
 
 I first met autistic children as a trainee clinical psychologist, and I was captivated 
for life. I thought them hauntingly mysterious. How could they do jigsaw puzzles 
straight off, and yet never even respond to my simple requests to play with them? 
What was going on? How could they be tested? Here was a challenge that cried out 
for basic research.  
 
My mentors, Beate Hermelin and Neil O’Connor, knew how to do elegant 
experiments with children who hardly had any language and were more than a little 
wild. I was elated when they offered to supervise me, and I got my dream job in 
their lab after I finished my PhD. I was hooked on the experimental study of 
cognitive abilities and disabilities in young children with autism and I wanted to 
know how they differed from other children. One of the innovations that O’Connor 
and Hermelin had introduced me to was the mental-age match. They argued that 
comparing bright and intellectually impaired children would get us nowhere. The 
brighter would do better, and this told us nothing that we didn’t know already. 
Instead, they compared, say, 8-year-old children who on psychometric tests had a 
mental age of 4, with 4-year-old, typically developing children with a mental age of 
4.  
 
I was proud of one memory experiment I did during my apprenticeship as a PhD 
student. We observed that autistic children often had a remarkable facility in 
remembering words by rote. This allowed us to compare autistic and non-autistic 
children who had the same short-term memory span. What we found gave me a key 
insight: Typically developing children could remember many more words when 
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these words were presented in the form of sentences than if the same words were 
presented in a jumbled up fashion, but autistic children failed to show this 
advantage. I followed up this finding in experiments with binary sequences, with 
clear structure, e.g. abababab vs those without, such as aababaaa. The results 
suggested that structure or ‘meaning’ allowed stimuli to be packaged into bigger 
units and thereby extended memory span. Did autistic children not see meaning in 
the way other children did, I wondered? Did meaning not exert the same dynamic 
force in their information processing?  
 
This question occupied me for a long time. Some years later, it became a theory that 
I termed ‘weak central coherence.’  Briefly, the information we process is usually 
pulled together by a strong drive to cohere. We like things to make sense, we like a 
narrative, we like the big picture. In autism, I proposed, this drive is less strong.  
The downside is that individuals with autism do not see the forest for the trees. But 
there is also an upside: Not being hampered by a strong drive for central coherence 
could actually give you far better attention to detail. You are not lured away by an 
overall Gestalt to forget about its constituents, and you won’t fall prey to certain 
perceptual illusions. For the first time, here was a way to think about autism not just 
in terms of disabilities but also in terms of special talents.  
 
As I was developing this idea, I was worried that in all our experiments we were 
missing the social features of autism. My search for a glitch in processing social 
information would have been a hopeless quest, had it not been for Alan Leslie and 
Simon Baron-Cohen. Alan had asked the exciting question how young infants were 
able to understand pretend play while they were still learning about the real world. 
 4 
How on earth could they distinguish which was what? This reminded me of a 
finding nobody had paid much attention to: Autistic children show little, if any, 
pretend play.  Alan proposed a cognitive mechanism that could underpin the ability 
to decouple representations of an event so that they could become second-order 
representations. They could then be freely embedded into an agent’s mental states: 
the agent can wish, pretend or believe the original event. Could it be that the 
decoupling mechanism was missing in autistic individuals? In that case, they should 
not be able to understand that another person can have a false belief.  
 
Why should this matter? Beliefs and other mental states, such as pretense, wishes, 
and knowledge, are what enable us to predict what others are going to do. We don’t 
predict this on the basis of the physical state of affairs. So, John will open his 
umbrella because he believes it is raining, regardless of whether it is actually 
raining. Tracking mental states is grist to the mill of our everyday folk psychology, 
also known as Theory of Mind. To be able to talk about this ability, we coined a 
new word, mentalizing.  
 
Simon, Alan, and I were excited to find out more about this ability. One of the tasks 
we developed was the Sally Ann task. It is played out with two dolls, Sally and 
Ann. Sally has a marble and puts it in her basket. She then leaves the scene. While 
she is out, Ann takes the marble from the basket and puts it into her box. Sally 
comes back and wants to play with her marble. The critical question is: ‘Where will 
she look for the marble?’ The right answer is, of course, ‘in the basket’, because that 
is where she believes it is.  
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The results amazed us, as they were so clear cut: Typical 4-years olds and older 
learning disabled children passed this task, while autistic children didn’t. They had 
failed to understand that Sally had a false belief and therefore made the wrong 
prediction of where she was going to look. This and other experiments threw new 
light on the social communication problems in autism: If you don’t understand 
mental states, then you wouldn’t understand deception nor get the point of most 
jokes. You wouldn’t get the point of keeping secrets, nor would you understand any 
narratives that depended on ‘she doesn’t know that he knows’ scenarios. It would 
limit ordinary social interactions in just the way that interactions with autistic 
people are limited. 
 
With the advent of the new neuroimaging methods, we could now try to visualize 
this cognitive mechanism in the brain. One of the pioneers in neuroimaging was my 
husband, Chris Frith, and he and his colleagues were sufficiently interested to set up 
a then still daring series of studies.  We designed stories, cartoons, and animated 
triangles, which could be presented in carefully matched conditions, which either 
did or did not require mentalizing. This difference allowed us to see a difference in 
brain activity in several critical brain regions, forming a mentalizing network. Other 
labs were able to replicate this.  
 
One disappointment was that we could not immediately see what was different in 
the brains of autistic people during mentalizing. But to unravel this required many 
studies by many people in many different labs. This led us to a better understanding 
of mentalizing, and has already resulted in differentiating two forms: an apparently 
innate and unconscious form, and an acquired conscious form that is influenced by 
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culture. This second form can be acquired by autistic people through compensatory 
learning. 
     
Is there a lesson from my studies beyond the world of autism? I believe that the 
studies have demonstrated the usefulness of the cognitive level of explanation. The 
purely behavioral level is not sufficiently transparent for us to deduce the 
underlying causes; there are just too many. But, we can predict what behaviors 
might arise if a particular cognitive process were faulty. This was the point of the 
Sally Ann test: Nobody before had observed that autistic children failed to 
understand false beliefs. The beauty of this result was that it suddenly made sense of 
a range of hitherto unconnected behavioral observations, such as the poverty of 
pretend play, the inability to tell lies, and the incomprehension of irony.  
 
Our concept of autism has changed enormously since the 1960s. There are likely to 
be many different phenotypes hidden in the autism spectrum. It is now time to split 
up subgroups and relate specific cognitive processes to specific causes, in the brain 
and in characteristic patterns of behavior. Mentalizing is not all there is to being 
social. There are other cognitive processes that underpin our social behavior that 
might be faulty and give rise to different problems and possibly different forms of 
autism. We simply need the right theoretical glasses to see differences in the 
spectrum, which are now blurred. Whether these subgroups conveniently map onto 
specific biological causes is another question. It is likely that there are hundreds of 
genetic and other biological causes, too many to make meaningful subgroups. At the 
behavioral level, each individual is in a class of his or her own. In contrast, at the 
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cognitive level, there is a nexus, which might hold a manageable handful of 
phenotypes. My money is on cognition. 
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